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The big slide of economic activity – of employment in relation to labor
force and male labor force participation in relation to working-age population
– among the OECD economies from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s in most
cases and the long slump that followed sparked new structuralist modeling of
employment determination and supplied an empirical record for testing it.
Some consensus has grown up on the main mechanisms and causal forces
behind the deep slump.
1
In the 1990s, though, structural recovery became evident in many OECD
countries. Unemployment in Ireland, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Denmark
improved in the first half of the 1990s and again in the second half.
2 The U.S.,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Spain gained strongly in the second half.
More recently, Sweden and Finland began to rebound from lost export
markets early in the decade. Recovery, if any, in the other OECD members
was too little and too late to change much their end-of-decade score. France,
Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Greece saw a net setback over the
decade and Belgium, Portugal and Norway barely progressed.
To search for important sources of the great slump – the shift of
equilibrium unemployment rates onto higher paths in the 1980s – one had an
idea where to look. OECD unemployment rates had risen roughly together
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s – deviations were mostly in the timing
– so the favored candidates to explain the movement were all OECD-wide
shocks. Models of the equilibrium path set out by Phelps, with their emphasis
on the profitability of business assets and the reward to work relative to
workers’ other support, pointed to five common shocks in that period:
3
OECD-wide increases in the effective cost of capital resulting from the
reduced expectations of productivity growth emerging in the 1970s and the
increased expected world real rate of interest emerging in the early 1980s;
increases both in the income and services from private assets and in the
benefits from social entitlements relative to after-tax wage levels resulting
from the 1970s productivity slowdown and from the growth of the welfare
state in the 1960s and 1970s; finally, the 1970s hikes in the world real price
of oil.
4 A model by  Layard, Jackman and Nickell (1991) pointed to new or
                                                                
1  Convergence by several scholars on a small set of macroeconomic forces and institutions
can be seen in the recent symposium on unemployment in the Economic Journal. See Nickell
(1998), Phelps and Zoega (1998), and Madsen (1998).
2  The U.S. case is not a full recovery since a fixed-weight index of the unemployment rates
in the four educational groups is still short of its 1965 and 1970 levels.
3  Phelps (1994).
4  Econometric support for these forces was found in Phelps (1994)  and Phelps and Zoega
(1996). Further evidence supporting real interest rates or productivity growth rates or both3
expanded institutions in the  postwar era, especially in Europe, such as
unemployment insurance benefits and job protections, that heightened the
sensitivity of unemployment to shocks.
5
Finding sources of the selective and uneven recoveries begun in the 1990s
is a different sort of problem. Was there a shock or evolution in the
recovering countries not found in the non-recovering countries? Was there an
OECD-wide shock or evolution that powered recovery in some countries
while blocked from doing so in the non-recovering economies? In either case,
are the causal forces and mechanisms within the compass of existing theory
or can they be accommodated by present models?
The first hypotheses we will examine credit the progress in recovering
countries to their adoption of structural reforms and blames the continued
stagnation elsewhere to a failure to enact similar programs. One such
hypothesis, developed by Stephen Nickell and the OECD Secretariat, points
to reforms in labor policy by several OECD members. In this thesis, the huge
rise of unemployment in Europe was made possible by those countries’ anti-
market labor policies and the remedy lies in eradicating those policies. The
chief areas for reform are the high and long duration of unemployment
insurance benefits, the high density and wide coverage of unions in wage-
setting, and employment-protection laws driving up the average wait of the
unemployed for a job.
6 Of course, good economic policy is crucial for good
economic performance. Yet it may be that these particular reforms had little
or no effectiveness. Perhaps planting the institutions of capitalism or maybe
low-wage employment subsidies would be vastly more effective in cutting
unemployment (even if more costly in other dimensions). Europeans who
value welfare state protections want to know whether the unemployment
reduction obtained by scaling them back is large enough to compensate for
the loss of security.
The second area of the paper examines some monetary hypotheses, which
deviate to varying degrees from the non-monetary approach of the
structuralist models. We first test the thesis of Fitoussi and others that tight-
money in France, Italy and some others candidates for the EMU operated in
the 1990s, at least the middle years, to depress employment far below its
                                                                                                                                                                               
can be found in Blanchard (1997, 2000), Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell and
Layard (1998) and Phelps and Zoega (1998). Recent evidence confirming the role of wealth
can be found in Phelps and Zoega (1998) and Blanchard and Katz (1997).
5  Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).
6  See Nickell and Layard (1998), Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998) and OECD (1999).4
structural-equilibrium path.
7 This is related to Ball’s more radical thesis that
prolonged monetary tightness in some OECD economies in the early or mid-
1990s produced a  hysteresis effect leaving today’s equilibrium
unemployment path on a higher track than it would otherwise be on.
8
There is one conspicuous shock that is rather widespread in the OECD:
the sensational rise of share prices and market capitalization found on most
organized exchanges from New York to Helsinki, much of it  fueled, it
appears, by high expectations about the future profits from the new
information technologies – in short, the new economy. That a rise in firms'
valuation of the business assets they invest in – their investments in their
employees, the customers they have acquired, and their stocks of tangible
capital – would generally boost the equilibrium path of employment (not just
customers, plant and equipment) was a clear implication of Phelps's
theoretical framework. And, arguably, the rise in market  capitalization
reflects a rise in the valuation of investments in such business assets, present
or future – or, vice-versa, a rise in market  capitalization induces firms'
managers to raise the value they assign to investing in such assets. A loose
relationship between share price and employment growth found in U.S. data
has given some empirical support for the argument.
9
The last part of this paper will try to gauge the strength of the average
relationship between the stock market and employment growth in the OECD
countries and proceed to investigate whether disparities in the size of the
stock market booms are broadly consistent with the selectivity, unevenness
and timing of the recent recoveries. It will be desirable to try to determine
whether the not yet recovered economies have had a smaller rise in their stock
markets, properly measured, or whether some factors have blocked or delayed
them from the average responsiveness to their stock-market rise.
The next section introduces our framework. A necessary exercise here is
to verify that not all the recoveries (and failures to recover) are well explained
by the garden-variety market forces on which we have previously placed our
emphasis: the world real rate of interest, national productivity growth rates,
and the after-tax reward to work relative to workers’ nonwage support, such
as the imputed income from their durables and their (or their relatives’) social
benefits.
                                                                
7  Fitoussi (1998). Of course the contention of some that regular and equal-sized devaluations
would have keep employment bounded above its equilibrium path is radically counter to the
structuralist view.
8  Ball (1999).
9  Phelps (1999).5
Two Baseline Unemployment Equations
Our past empirical tests of these structuralist ideas have viewed macro
forces as acting upon the valuations of the various business assets in two
ways: One way is through the cost of capital. The other way is through the
profits on business assets and thus possibly expected future profits.
In the models, the long-term gross cost of capital is the domestic long-
term expected real interest rate. The correct measure, as first emphasized by
Pissarides, is the gross cost net of the expected long-term growth rate, g, of
the productivity of labor.
10 In our model, the reciprocal of this (net) cost of
capital is a reasonable trial proxy for the shadow price of a trained employee
and of the other business assets, given the “level” from which the expected
stream of profits from such an asset starts.
11
For econometric purposes our measure of the gross cost of capital is an
external measure, the average long-term real interest rate in the G7 – dubbed
the world real interest rate and denoted r*.
12 The path of the net cost of
capital is juxtaposed against the path of the unemployment rate in each of the
G7 countries ex Japan in Appendix A1. The increases in this variable between
the early 1970s and the mid-1980s are huge, though not equal and
synchronous, in every country and precede large increases in the national
unemployment rate. It is thus plausible that the slowdowns in  labor
productivity and the elevation of world interest rates played a big role in the
rise of unemployment to its 1980s peak.
One can also see a major turnaround of this variable in recent years,
owing to higher domestic productivity growth as well as a somewhat lower
r*, in many of the OECD economies. The improved productivity performance
in the 1990s may account for some part of the recovery in process in many of
the OECD economies. Tables in Appendix A1 show the changes from period
to period in the average rate of growth of the (Hodrick-Prescott smoothed)
productivity of labor, defined as GDP per person employed. The productivity-
                                                                
10  The argument by Pissarides (1990) that the expected g enters into the  capitalization of
business assets was used in some theoretical exercises in Phelps (1994). Our empirical work
began using  r* without g but we brought g in once we  realized the importance of the
productivity slowdown for understanding the slump, especially on the Continent. See  Hoon
and Phelps (1997).
11 The reciprocal gives the present discounted value of a stream of profits that starts at 1 and
grows at constant rate g.  If each trained employee produced that stream of gross profit, after
deducting the interest on the fixed capital and customers he will have to work with (given the
current cost of capital), that reciprocal would indeed be the market value of such an
employee.
12 This is the average of the real long term interest rate calculated from the yield on 10-year
government bonds and the rate of price inflation in the following four quarters.6
growth slowdown in the 1970s is evident in all of the countries. Yet the recent
productivity speedup is very selective.  Among the countries that have
experienced a marked reduction of unemployment in the 1990s, Australia,
Denmark, Ireland and New Zealand have also enjoyed a recovery in the rate
of productivity growth and so has the U.S. when productivity is calculated
from the recent GDP data revision; the Netherlands and the U.K., on the other
hand, do not show a productivity speedup. Of the non-recovering countries,
only Norway has seen improvements in the rate of productivity growth. So,
while surely no single causal variable would vary from country to country so
as to account for the diverse experience of the OECD countries in the past
decade, there is a tendency for improvements in employment and in
productivity growth to coincide.
The differences in the evolution of productivity growth – hence the net
cost of capital – across countries are significant. To illustrate these
differences we show the data for one of the clearest success stories, Ireland,
and compare them with those of Italy, where unemployment has been
persistently high. In both countries the spectacular rise in the cost of capital in
the late 1970s or early 1980 preceded a long climb of the unemployment rate.
The recovery of the cost of capital to 1960s-early 1970s levels in Ireland was
followed by a good employment recovery while the partial recovery of capital
costs in Italy lead to no recovery.
Figure 1.  Unemployment and the Net Cost of Capital
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD data.
The association between the unemployment rates and the cost of capital
apparent in the two figures above is consistent with our theoretical













































with alternative models. What we have here is a failure to reject our own
prior. Yet we believe that the strength of this association is a feature that any
model of unemployment has to provide.
Clearly the cost of capital is not a sufficient explanatory variable. The
value placed upon a trained employee and upon the other business assets
depends on the “level” from which the expected stream of profits from such
an asset starts, not just on the net cost of capital used to value the stream. So
we require alongside the cost of capital one or more explanatory variables
that impact on profitability through their influence on the zero-profit curve or
the wage curve. One such variable in our models is workers’ income or
services from wealth, private and social, relative to the reward to their work.
The income from  social wealth,  y
S, includes social insurance and social
assistance benefits; the income and services from private wealth, y
W, includes
the income not only from stocks and bonds issued by domestic firms but also
consumer durables, national public debt, and net overseas assets. An increase
in such income would increase quitting (shirking, absenteeism, etc.) at each
unemployment rate, which would add to unit costs and thus reduce the
valuation of employees, which would slow  firms’hiring and thus the growth
of employment. Similarly, a decrease of productivity or an increase of tax
rates on labor, in increasing the incomes from wealth relative to after-tax pay,
would exacerbate quitting etc. and thus lower employee valuations. (Thus
productivity level and tax rates on  labor matter for unemployment through
their effect on the after-tax wage relative to the income and services from
workers' wealth.
13)  The effect of this income-to-net-pay variable on the
unemployment rate may be captured by introducing as a surrogate the total
level of  nonwage income and benefits per worker as a  ratio to the
productivity of labor multiplied by the ratio of before-tax to after-tax wage – a
compound variable we call  normalized  nonwage support 
S W y y ~ ~ + .
14 The
other of these profitability variables that we have used is the world real price
of energy, though we will not pause to discuss that variable.
Appendices A2 and A3 show, respectively, the evolution of income from
private wealth and social spending juxtaposed with the unemployment rate in
the G7 ex Japan. As may be seen, the movement is far from identical from
country to country. Yet there is a tendency over these countries for
                                                                
13  The econometric formulation here leaves open the possibility that in the long run wealth
will have adjusted so as to restore the after-tax wage-to-wealth ratio to some long-run level
that is independent of tax rates and of the cumulative  labor augmentation from past technical
progress.
14  The derivation is laid out in Appendix B1.8
normalized nonwage support to show a cumulative rise starting in the middle
of the 1970s and continuing for many years. In those countries where
productivity accelerates in the 1990s, however, there is a tendency for the
variable sooner or later to descend. Again, we show the data for Ireland and
Italy. The Irish data, which begin in 1977, show a downward trend in recent
years while in Italy there is no such trend visible in recent years.
Figure 2. Unemployment and Nonwage Support
Source:  OECD.
Our previous work estimated equations explaining either the normalized
increase of employment  or the level of the unemployment rate, with the
lagged unemployment rate always among the explanatory variables. Equation
(1) is a stripped-down version of a typical example of these equations, re-
estimated here with the observations of the 1990s and using a 19 country
OECD sample for the period 1960-1998.
15:
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1 ~ ~    (1)
Here u is the rate of unemployment, r* is the world real rate of interest, g
is the (smoothed) rate of change of labor productivity,
16 p
* is the real price of
oil, 
S W y y ~ ~ +  is the ratio of total nonwage support (per worker) (in the labor
force) to labor productivity, t
d is the rate of direct household taxes, t
p the rate
of payroll taxes,  and p is the rate of price inflation.
17
                                                                
15  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.
16  This is a  Hodrick-Prescott-smoothed rate of change of labor productivity defined as real
GDP per employed worker. The smoothing parameter has value 100.
17  We include a dummy variable for Finland and Germany in the 1990s – both countries
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Note that as an effort to control for “effective-demand” shocks we include
the change in the rate of inflation, following Layard et al.
18 The idea is that if
unemployment changes because of movements in aggregate demand, this is
likely to be reflected in changes in the rate of price inflation. The inclusion of
the inflation-shock term may thus clean away such business-cycle
movements, leaving what are changes in the natural rate to be explained by
the remaining regressors.
We first estimate equation (1) for each country separately without
imposing any cross-country restrictions. This is important to do because once
we start constraining coefficients to take the same value across countries the
possibility arises that a significant relationship for some of the countries
creates the illusion of a sample-wide relationship, i.e. if we have one group of
countries where our equation fits and  another where it does not fit, the panel
estimation may yield significant results only due to the inclusion of the
former group of countries. The results are shown in Appendix A4. The
coefficients of the interest rate f1 and oil prices  f3 are generally positive
while those of productivity growth  f2 and the inflation term  g tend to be
negative. However, the coefficient of  nonwage income does not have the
same consistent pattern.






have identical values across countries up to a factor of proportionality, qi; so
that their ratios to one another are the same in all countries:






it t it t i t i i i it t
t








+ + + + + + =
-
-












1 ~ ~   (2)
The idea behind this restriction is that the differences in the effect of
shocks across countries lie largely in the degree of real-wage rigidity, which
can be captured by the parameter qi.
Four versions of the equation appear in Table 1. In the first column of
Table 1 we omit both elements of nonwage support and then add normalised
nonwage income (
W y ~ ) in the second column. We then add the comparable
variable that measures the level of social spending or transfers per worker
also normalized by productivity (
S y ~ ) and then add the two together in the
last column.
19
                                                                                                                                                                               
when an immigration wave temporarily raised unemployment. Yet our stripped-down
baseline regressions cannot track satisfactorily the Portuguese unemployment rate.
18  Layard et al. (1991) and Phelps (1994).
19 When we add nonwage income we have an unbalanced panel due to missing observations at the
beginning of the sample period.10





Variable estimate t-stat. estimate t-stat. estimate t-stat. estimate t-stat.



















Nonwage income 0.65 1.48
Social spending -0.17 0.80
Nonwage support 1.02** 3.09
Source:  OECD database.  The unemployment rate is the OECD standardized rate. Real interest rates are
calculated from quarterly data on the annual yield on 1-year government bonds and the rate of price
inflation in the subsequent four quarters where the price deflator is used.  The world real rate of interest
r* is calculated as the average of the real rates in the G7 countries.  The rate of productivity growth is
defined as the rate of growth of real GDP per employed worker and smoothed using the  Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. Unemployment, interest rates and growth rates are written
as percentages. The real price of oil is measured as the U.S. PPI for crude petroleum to overall U.S. PPI.
Nonwage income is calculated as the ratio of income from property per worker in the  labor force and
real GDP per employed worker. Social spending is calculated in the same way using social-security
benefits. Payroll taxes are equal to the ratio of social-security contributions and the wage bill and direct
taxes are defined as the ratio of direct household taxes and household income.  Note: ** significant at
5% level, * significant at 10% level.  a) Australia omitted. b) Australia and New Zealand omitted.
The coefficients of real interest rates, productivity growth and oil prices
are all correctly signed and significant.
20 The  nonwage support variable is
also significant although its individual components are less so.
21
Table 2 reports for the column (1) benchmark equation the estimates of
our fixed effects  ai, the sensitivity coefficients  qi and the persistence
parameters li, in addition to the coefficient of the inflation shock gi. We note
that many of the “success” economies are high-sensitivity/low persistence
ones: the UK (q = 2.41, l = 0.70), the Netherlands (q = 1.35, l = 0.73) and
the US (q = 1.16, l = 0.48).
                                                                
20 We experimented with changing the smoothing parameter used to calculate trend
productivity growth.  When it took the values (50, 150, 250) the coefficient of productivity
growth was respectively (-0.19 (2.17), -0.23 (2.21) and -0.25 (2.26)).
21 Note that the sample changes when we add nonwage income – Australia drops out – and
again when social spending is added – both Australia and New Zealand are omitted.11
Table 2.  Further Estimation Results for Equation (2) (column 1)

























































































































































Note: t-ratios in parentheses.
Table 3 quantifies the impact of real interest rates and the productivity
growth rate on unemployment. It shows both the instantaneous effect and the
steady-state effect of a rise in r* of 5 percentage points – that is a 500 basis
point increase – and a fall in the rate of trend productivity growth by 3
percentage points – a 300 basis point decrease – for a sample of the countries.
Our world real interest rate variable rose by 5 percentage points between the
1970s and 1980s while a slowdown in the rate of productivity growth
between 2 and 3 percentage points was not uncommon between the average
of the 1960s and the average of the 1970s.12
Table 3. Interest-Rate and Productivity-Growth Effects
on Unemployment
Du measured in percentages
France Germany Italy U.K. U.S.
current effect 0.15 0.17 0.07 0.51 0.25
Dr* = 5% steady-state
effect
1.84 0.92 1.40 1.55 0.48
current effect 0.38 0.45 0.18 1.33 0.64
Dg = -3% steady-state
effect
4.78 2.38 3.66 4.03 1.25
Both the instantaneous and the steady-state effects differ between the
countries. The magnitude of the interest rate effects is in the same ballpark as
recent estimates by Blanchard (2000) while the effect of growth appears
substantially higher. Taken together a simultaneous rise in r* and fall in g can
account for a large part of the elevation of average unemployment between
the 1960s and 1980s.  The figure below shows the actual change in average
unemployment between recent decades plotted against the fitted change from
equation (2) for the 19 countries in our sample. The fit is quite good.
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Explaining Differences across Countries: Shocks versus Institutions
In our baseline regression, we have estimated the value of the sensitivity
coefficient ( qi) as well as the country-specific fixed effects ( ai) and the
persistence parameter (li) in equation (2). We now look to the institutional
structure of these countries to explain the differences in the three parameters
across the countries. But note that the parameters qi and li  affect only the
degree of the unemployment response to macroeconomic shocks.
Layard and coauthors hypothesized that unemployment differences across
countries could be attributed to differences in the level of the replacement
ratio, the duration of unemployment benefits, union coverage and –density,
union-  and employer coordination, active labor-market expenditures and an
index of employment protection.
22  The results are reported in Table 4.
We find that these variables explain around 50% of the variation of  the a
and  q coefficients. The fixed effects ( a) are a positive function of the
replacement ratio, union coverage and –density, and a negative function of
union coordination. The sensitivity to shocks (q) is a positive function of the
duration of benefits and union density and a negative function of union
coordination and labor-market expenditures. We report the results for both the
instantaneous effect and also the steady-state effect when we take into
account the persistence parameter li.
23
We conclude that the sign of each coefficients in the a- and q equations is
as expected from a reading of Elmeskov, Layard et al and Nickell.
24 These
results confirm the significant effect of labor-market institutions on medium-
term unemployment changes. But it may not be the institutions themselves
that are a cause of the unemployment problem but an unfortunate
combination of labor-demand shocks and institutions.
                                                                
22 Layard et al. (1991). See also Nickell and Layard (1998) from which our data come.
23 The sensitivity- and persistence parameters are strongly negatively correlated.
24  Elmeskov et al. (1998), Layard et al (1991) and Nickell and Layard (1998).14
Table 4.  Parameters Explained – cross section with 19 observations























































                           
              Note:  t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level.  * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + + = Y x 1 0
where x = a,  q, g and Y is a vector of the explanatory variables; replacement ratio, duration
of benefits – the number of months at which benefits continue at a reasonable level –  union
coverage, union density, coordination of unions and employers (indices where “3” refers to
maximum coordination)  employment protection and active  labor market spending. We use
the average value for the variables 1983-1988.
Can the baseline equation account for the diversity of recent
experience?
The question arises whether our simple benchmark equation (2) explains,
without the benefit of new ideas, the diverse experience of OECD countries in
the 1990s. To assess this, we estimated equation (2) for the period 1960-1991
and then did out-of-sample simulations and compared these with the actual
evolution of unemployment during the period 1992-1998. The following table
classifies the 19 countries in our sample according to whether the difference
between the actual and the predicted unemployment rate was less than 1.5
points in 1998.15




As expected Higher than
expected
Finland  (-2.67) Austria  (0.57) Australia (1.89)
Ireland   (-4.49) Denmark  (-0.25) Belgium (4.70)
New Zealand  (-1.72)
a Canada (0.80) France  (3.26)
Norway (-3.32) Japan  (1.35) Germany (3.59)
United States (-1.78) Netherlands (-1.15) Italy (3.55)




Note: Numerical difference between actual and predicted unemployment
in parentheses.
a equation for New Zealand in estimated using data up to 1994 ; 
b 1996.
In the U.S. case, unemployment was 1.78 percentage points lower in 1998
than expected so the recent descent is not fully accounted for. When looking
at recent years, Ireland has done better than what we would have expected
from our model while Denmark and the U.K. have done about as well as we
could have expected and Australia somewhat worse. On the continent,
France, Germany, Italy and Spain all have done worse.
A key question addressed in this paper is what accounts for the cross-
country differences in the evolution of unemployment in the 1990s. We
consider three possible types of explanations.
First, there is the appeal to labor-market reforms by the OECD secretariat.
These views would credit the strong reduction of unemployment in some
countries to policy reforms instead of private-sector market forces.
There is the New  Keynesian view that cyclical downturns have a
persistent effect on unemployment through some form of  hysteresis and the
Anti-Inflationist view that countries lowered their equilibrium unemployment
path by conquering their inflation.
Finally, deriving from our own models’ property that employment
depends on the level of asset valuations, there is the empirical hypothesis that
a stock-market index or market  capitalization series provides a proxy for
those asset valuations that play a pivotal role in employment growth. The
predictions of this hypothesis are compared with the data in the last section.16
Labor-Market Reforms
A careful study in the OECD Secretariat has identified several countries
that it regards as having accepted its proposals for labor-market reform.
25 The
recommendations involve measures to reduce or eliminate labor- and product-
market restrictions and regulations, to increase spending on active  labor-
market programs and to reduce the duration of benefits. The countries are
Australia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the U.K.
Three recent papers describe some of these changes.
26
•  Apart from Australia, all of these countries either kept unchanged or
reduced the generosity of the unemployment-benefit system in the 1990s.
Yet, we must add, France, Finland, Germany, Spain and Sweden, all
countries usually not counted among the success stories, did the same. Spain
came later.
•  Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands also spent more than the OECD
average on active labor-market programs and increased this spending in the
1990s.
•  The six countries reduced the labor-tax wedge in the 1990s.
•  Union power was reduced in the U.K. in the 1980s, and in New Zealand in
the 1990s. Moves towards decentralization of wage bargaining were made
in Australia and in Denmark. The government started greater coordination
with unions and employers in Ireland and the Netherlands.
•  Employment-protection legislation (EPL) has been relaxed in Australia,
the Netherlands and the U.K.
We can point to several other significant “institutional” reforms in the 1990s:
the gradual reduction of the minimum wage in the U.S.; the increase in the
size and coverage of U.S. EITC, the increasing exemption of low incomes
from income tax and the massive subsidies for wage supplements or for
training in the Netherlands, France and the U.S.
The table below demonstrates how potent measures of  labor-market
institutions are in explaining cross-country differences in average
unemployment.  When looking at the average rate of unemployment in the
1980s and a set of institutional variables used by Nickell and Layard (1998)
for the years 1983-1988 we are able to explain around 65% of the variation in
unemployment and the sign and significance of the institutional variables is as
expected.
                                                                
25  Elmeskov et al. (1998).
26  Scarpetta (1996), Elmeskov et al. (1998) and Nickell and Ours (2000).17
Table 6.  Labor-market Institutions and the Rate of Unemployment
(19 OECD countries)

































    R
2 0.79
2 R 0.65
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + + = Y u s 1 0 80
where u 80s the average rate in the 1980s and Y is the set of explanatory variables; the
replacement ratio, the duration of benefits, union coverage and – density, employment –
protection legislation, labor-market expenditures and centralisation of unions and employers.
The institutional measures are averages for the period 1983-1988.
Source: Nickell and Layard (1998).
The unemployment problem appears to lie in a high unemployment-
benefit replacement ratio and a long duration of these benefits, high coverage
and density of unions, employment protection and low coordination of unions
and employers in addition to low labor-market expenditures.
27
While the importance of  labor-market institutions is almost universally
accepted, it is also widely believed – certainly by us – that the shocks that
pushed the equilibrium unemployment path to higher and higher tracks in the
1970s and 1980s were mostly of a different nature.
28 A previous section
indicated the ones we have  emphasized in past work. Many of the  labor-
market institutions in the OECD set may have played a role in propagating
shocks rather than originating them, since they had their origins well before
                                                                
27 When Sweden is removed from the sample, labor-market expenditures become insignificant.
28  See Fitoussi and Phelps, 1988; Phelps, 1994; Phelps and Zoega, 1997, 1998; Blanchard, 1999.18
the rise, beginning in the mid-1970s, in unemployment rates.
29 In view of the
past influence of market forces – productivity growth and the rest – we think
that exclusive reliance on institutional change as an explanation of recent
developments is premature.
Our approach differs from that of  Elmeskov et al., cited above, in that
they use a panel of countries in which the institutional variables explain
mainly the cross-sectional variation in unemployment as in Table 6. They do
not test whether observed changes in average unemployment can be
accounted for by changes in  labor-market institutions as opposed to
macroeconomic variables. To repeat, it is possible that the institutions have
mainly been important in determining the impact of global shocks rather than
being the forcing variables.
We now attempt to explain variation in the change in unemployment
between the periods 1980-1989 and 1990-1998 across the 19 OECD countries
by changes in the institutional variables alone. The results are shown in
Table 7.
Table 7.  Labor-market Reforms and Changes in Unemployment
between the 1980s and 1990s
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2 0.73 2 R 0.45
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
                                                                
29  See Krugman (1994) on this point.19
e a a + D + = - Y u u s s 1 0 80 90
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u 80s the average rate in the 1980s
and Y is the set of explanatory variables; the replacement ratio, the duration of benefits,
union coverage and –density, employment-protection legislation,  labor-market expenditures
and centralisation of unions and employers. These are average values for the periods 1983-
1988 and 1989-1994. These data are from Nickell and Layard  (1998).
The results show that an increase in union coordination tends to decrease
unemployment. However, this result stems only from a fall in union
coordination in Finland (which experienced a rise of unemployment). All
other variables describing  labor-market reforms have either insignificant or
incorrectly-signed coefficients, or both.
Next we test for the effect of macroeconomic shocks and report the results
in Table 8. We include the change in average nonwage support 
S W y y ~ ~ +  and
the change in the average rate of productivity growth while omitting the least
significant among the institutional variables. An increase in the share of
nonwage income of GDP is associated with an increase in the unemployment
rate while the coefficient of the productivity growth variable is correctly
signed but statistically insignificant.








































(0.90) 2 R 0.77 0.97
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + D + = - Y u u s s 1 0 80 90
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s the average rate in the 1980s
and Y is the set of explanatory variables; nonwage support, trend productivity growth and the
fitted unemployment rate from benchmark equation (2).20
We are lead to believe that variation in the macroeconomic shocks alone
cannot adequately explain the variation in the evolution of unemployment
without taking into account differences in the way the economies respond to
such shocks, i.e. institutional differences. What remains is to quantify the
effect of global shocks acting differently on the respective countries due to
differences in their sensitivity, qi, to such common shocks. Our estimation
results for equation (2) demonstrate the potency of the interplay of institutions
and shocks and demonstrate that these interactive effects can potentially
explain the differences in the evolution of unemployment across the
countries. We now add the fitted unemployment rate from our baseline
equation (2) that takes into account the interplay of shocks and institutions.
The results are also reported in Table 8. The inclusion of this variable renders
others insignificant while explaining almost all the variation in the data.
We conclude that the institutional reforms in the OECD proposal can only
be a small part of the story. In several countries the equilibrium
unemployment has fallen in the absence of net reform in our estimation while
in others the net reform has not apparently affected equilibrium
unemployment significantly.
Monetary Theses
In this section the first hypothesis examined is that tight-money policy in
France, Italy and some other aspirants to EMU membership operated to keep
employment down, far below its structuralist-equilibrium path. This could
explain why unemployment was higher in 1998 than what our baseline
equation predicted in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The idea is that
countries that try to defend the value of their currencies by raising their
interest rates would suffer an additional rise in unemployment.
We again used the cross section of 19 countries to explain the variation
unemployment growth between the 1980s and 1990s with variation in
changes in different measures of monetary policy. In particular, we focused
on the following:
•  That changes in the average rate of inflation may cause changes in
average unemployment following Akerlof, Dickens and Perry. Here expected
inflation only enters the cognitive model used by decision makers if inflation
is above some threshold. The result is a permanent tradeoff between inflation
and unemployment at low rates of unemployment. We entered the difference21
in the average inflation rate between the decades in levels and also squared to
account for nonlinearities.
•  That positive inflation shocks reduce average unemployment due to some
form of hysteresis. We included both the difference in the average inflation
shock for the two decades, that is the difference between the two, and also the
difference between the maximum inflation shock in each decade.
•  That changes in average short-term nominal or real interest rates caused
changes in average unemployment. Here we take a rise in either to represent
contractionary monetary policy.
•  Finally,  that changes in the average slope of the yield curve between
decades may signify a regime shift in the monetary policy stance.
We first report the results for the inflation variables in Table 9. In the first
column we can see that the average level of inflation is correlated with the
average level of unemployment while the two measures of inflation shocks –
changes in the rate of inflation within each period – perform poorly. A
decrease in the average level of inflation tends to go together with an increase
in average unemployment. This is in accordance with the Akerlof et al. thesis
but only explains around 15% of the variation in the data indicating that this
cannot be the most important causal variable. We also put a dummy variable
for those countries that stayed in the EMS during the 1990s but this did not
affect the results reported in the table while the dummy was insignificant in
every case.
We then look at the change in average (short-term) real and nominal
interest rates between the two decades and also the change in the average
slope of the yield curve. Of these, the real rate of interest performs best.
Changes in the domestic (short-run) real rate of interest also go hand in hand
with changes in average unemployment – an increase in the short rate
representing  contractionary monetary policy – raises the average rate of
unemployment but we can only explain around 25% of the variation in the
data. Finally, an upward-sloping yield curve – representing expansionary
monetary policy – goes with high unemployment.22









































2 0.29 0.15 0.21
2 R 0.15 -0.02 0.05
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + D + = - Y u u s s 1 0 80 90
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s the average rate in the 1980s
and Y is the set of explanatory variables; average inflation, the average of the first difference
of inflation and  the largest annual change in the inflation rate.






































2 R 0.25 -0.10 0.21
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + D + = - Y u u s s 1 0 80 90
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s the average rate in the 1980s
and Y is the set of explanatory variables; the average of the short-term real rate of interest
(one-year government bonds), the average of the short-term nominal interest rate and the
average slope of the yield curve (long minus short).23
Finally, we included both the level of inflation and the short-term real rate
of interest and found that the latter came out stronger.
So there is some evidence – although by no means conclusive – that
differences in the evolution of monetary policy across the countries made a
difference for their unemployment experience in the course of the decade. It
remains a tenable hypothesis that monetary policy in Continental Europe
caused unemployment to exceed its natural path over most of the 1990s – for
reasons having to do with the run-up to the EMU, the Maastrict Treaty, and
the tight money instituted by the Bundesbank to offset German unification
expenditures. But the evidence is not conclusive. Moreover, the tight money
episode, however important its influence may have been, appears to be over.
Germany and most of the economies tied closely to it, such as France,
Belgium, Italy and Spain, no longer have comparatively high short-term real
rates of interest; the rates in Ireland, Holland, Finland, the UK and Portugal
are appreciably higher, some markedly so.
30 Correspondingly, in the former
countries the unemployment rate has tended to recede, mostly in 1998-99, to
its level in the early 1990s – in France, for example, to 10.6, last seen in 1992.
And inflation rates have stopped falling. So it is doubtful that monetary policy
over the whole decade still plays a part in the failure of unemployment rates
in these countries to recover more strongly.
To sum up at this stage: In our analysis, the variation across OECD
members in the fall of unemployment is not adequately accounted for by the
cross-country variation in the pace of  labor-market reform and the cross-
country variation in inflation-rate and nominal-interest-rate changes. To
explain the variation in the unemployment data found in the 1990s – to
understand why unemployment has, for example, fallen so much in Ireland
and the US while remaining so high in Italy and France – therefore requires
adding at least one other causal force to the account. We turn now to our own
proposed hypothesis.
                                                                
30  See the convenient table in the Financial Times, June 12, 1999.24
The Jobs Impact of the ‘New Economy’ via Asset Prices
In this section we begin by arguing that the prospect of a "new economy"
– a prospect closer at hand in some OECD countries than in others – offers in
theory a possible explanation of the uneven structural recoveries in the 1990s.
We then compare the predictions of this argument with a variety of evidence.
The thesis goes roughly as follows. In virtually every OECD country,
expectations of a large step-up in productivity and thus the profit per unit on
various business assets have been created by the recent advances in
information and communications technologies. The prospect of a world in
which most firms and persons can access the Internet from computers, mobile
phones and television has stimulated expectations of new opportunities for
profitable investment, including investment in new employees – though these
opportunities are seen as more imminent in some countries than in others.
Where this prospect appears to be relatively near, as in the U.S., there has
been a  galvanizing effect among telecommunications firms and among
equipment manufacturers, service providers, and content producers for the
Internet. The consequent rise in financial wealth occurring in this sector has
had the knock-on effect of driving up home construction and other investment
in other consumer durables. So the economy appears to have all the trappings
of a general investment boom. We would comment that the expectation of
any other anticipated development boosting expected profitability at some
time in the future –  globalization, biogenetics, whatever – would serve as
well. (Of course, to the extent the expectation comes to be seen as
exaggerated and is therefore revised down, the boom will be scaled back. But
it is the expectation that matters, as long as it lasts.)
This confidence-driven investment boom, our thesis continues, has the
effect of creating jobs and pulling up (real) wages. The mechanism from the
expected future leap of profitability to a boom in the labor market involves
valuations of business assets. The transmission of the boom from business-
asset markets to the labor market is tailor-made for our forward-looking kind
of structuralist model – not that our models are likely to be the only ones to
portray expectations of a new earning plateau in the future as sparking an
inflation-free boom in the present.  Although employee incentives are the
heart of these incentive-wage models’ generation of unemployment (without
them there would be no unemployment), our models also have a brain: the
value-maximizing firms form expectations about the gross profit stream
obtainable over the future from new investments, which drives the real25
valuations of business assets, which in turn impact on the rates of investment
in these assets and ultimately on the equilibrium (i.e., correct-expectations)
path of employment. In these models, an anticipated one-time “step increase”
of productivity precipitates an immediate jump of asset values in anticipation
of their greater returns (rents) once productivity has increased and such
revaluations lead immediately to rising employment in the near term as well
as a lift in real wages. Obviously the value that managers rationally place on
an employee having the requisite  familiarization and orientation to the
workings and objectives, known as firm-specific training, is one of these
revaluations and an important one, but the argument does not absolutely
require that, since the other asset revaluations may very well affect positively
the demand for labor.
A stylized description of the effects of the future productivity shock under
discussion is provided by the turnover-training model, which focuses
exclusively on the intellectual capital that firms invest in their workforce and
supposes for simplicity that all the firms in the model’s open economy are in
the same industry. Figure 4 describes how the expectation of a single future
step increase in the marginal and average value-productivity of employees
causes an anticipatory jump in the valuation of the trained employee.
Importantly, employment is related here to the asset price  normalized by
productivity.
31 The reason is that hiring depends on the ratio of the asset
price, q
N, to productivity, Lj; so, indirectly, does quitting.
32 In the diagram,
the Asset Price Curve depicts how, if it were stationary, the ratio of asset
price to productivity (q
N/Lj) would depend on the tightness of the  labor
market (1 - u) and the Employment Curve depicts how, if it were stationary,
the level of 1 - u would depend on q
N/Lj. The steady-state rest point is at the
curves’ intersection.
33  With the diagram we can describe precisely the
equilibrium scenario is following the  newfound expectation of a future
increase of productivity. Starting from the rest point, q
N/Lj must jump up in
anticipation of the increased q
N following the future increase in productivity.
Thereupon both q
N/Lj and 1 - u must be rising, as hiring is up and quitting is
                                                                
31  The valuation of a prepared employee is normalized by the productivity of workers on the
production line gross of the interest and depreciation on the equipment used, since employees
moving from production to training are assumed to need an unchanged assortment of
equipment.
32  Given the  nonwage income relative to productivity, quitting is a function of the wage
relative to productivity, which wage setting makes a function of asset valuation relative to
productivity.
33  Appendix B2 provides information on the structure of the model, the slopes of the two
curves and the dynamics of the system. Or see  Hoon and Phelps (1992, 1996) and Phelps
(1994).26
down owing to the rise of q
N relative to Lj – althought the ensuing although
the ensuing labor-market tightening will be operating to attenuate those two
effects. When the great day arrives, q
N/Lj must jump down since L jumps up
and q
N does not jump. After that q
N continues to rise, gradually regaining its
former proportionality with L. In this aftermath, employment recedes back to
its steady-state level, since  q
N in this phase is depressed relative to
productivity.
34
Figure 4. Response of Employee Valuation to an Expected Increase in
Employee Productivity
It is important to add that the positive impact of expected future profitability
on the valuation of (non-tradable) capital good, such as office and factory
space, are also expansionary.
35
                                                                
34  Another sort of shock is the sudden increase in the expected and actual growth rate of
productivity. That kind of shock is not relied on here to motivate introduction of asset prices
since it were the only kind occurring we would expect that our measured productivity growth
variable would suffice to pick up the workings of this expectation. (For the record, such a
shock shifts up the Asset Price curve. Thus it lifts up the downward-sloping equilibrium
approach-path governing employment and the  normalized asset value. In the equilibrium
scenario, starting from the rest point, q
N/Lj, overshoots, subsequently giving up some of its
gain along the path to the rest point.
35  Suppose that this good is produced with labor alone while the consumer-good producing
sector uses the nontradable capital good as well as labor. Then the increase in the price of the
capital good is a rise in the value productivity of labor producing it with the result that wage27
An ideal test of these  structuralist models would estimate how the
valuations placed by managers on trained employees, tangible capital goods
and customers impact on the pace of employment increase. Lacking data on
most of these shadow prices, we improvise by  hypothesizing that one or
another measure of the firms’ value in the capital market can serve as a proxy
for these shadow prices. The next few sections pursue successive
implementations of this idea.
Returning to our two benchmark equations (1) and (2), we now proceed to
explore the explanatory power of capital-market measures of market
capitalization either as a reflection or as a sort of cause of managers’
valuations of their business assets (employees, customers and fixed assets). In
our minds, managers learn things inspiring them to raise their valuations, then
lay plans to invest in new (as well as old) employees, but analysts catch wind
of the brightened prospects, driving up share prices in advance of all or most
of the increase in business assets acquired; so our econometric tests are
shaped accordingly. But it could be that assets do not lag behind valuations
and it is possible even  that share prices lag the accumulation of business
assets – both driven by brighter prospects of profitability down the road.
To begin with, we try adding to the above set of explanatory variables the
(real) share price, p
s, as a proxy for both the effective cost of capital and the
profitability of one employee with his equilibrium outfit of tangible capital
and customers – more precisely, as a proxy for q
N, the valuation of the trained
employee. On that interpretation, the share price must be entered as a ratio to
the productivity of  labor, which, abstracting from capital other than trained
employees for the moment, is given simply by the (advancing) technology
parameter Lt. The reason is that the hiring decision must weigh the value of a
new trained employee against the opportunity cost of the “trainers” orienting
the new recruit, which is the existing employees’ productivity in production.
Recall, though, that while the hire rate may be so simply determined, the
increase of employment is equal to hiring net of quitting and dismissals for
shirking, and the rates of quitting and of shirking are functions of the income
from the private and social assets that workers can fall back on in when they
quit. The new equation is:
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rates are initially pulled up relative to wealth, quit rates drop and both the Asset Price Curve
and the Employment Curve are shifted in an expansionary way.28
Note that the cost of capital, r*- gi,  reappears in the equation in spite of
the introduction of the stock-market variable.  That is because the former
impacts on the size of the interest to be deducted from productivity in the
calculation of the ‘demand wage’ from the condition of zero pure profit (even
if the valuation of the asset were unchanged) and a decrease of the demand
wage, in stimulating more quitting, lowers the employment growth at the
current unemployment rate.
36 We stress that if the cost of capital  receives
credit for its total effects on employment in the statistical estimation, the
share price will play the role of conveying expectations of future shocks to
productivity and thus profitability.
The results are in Table 11. When we add the normalised share price in
column 2 we find it to be negative – a higher value corresponds to lower
unemployment – and significant at the 5% level.
Table 11.  Share Prices added to Unemployment Equation, 1960-1998.
Variables
Estimate   t-ratio
(1)
Estimate    t-ratio
(2)
Estimate     t-ratio
(3)













** 3.25 -0.43 2.74
real price of oil 2.39
** 2.58 1.45
** 2.90 1.93













** 2.75 -0.42 1.19
Note: **significant at 5% level. *significant at 10% level.
                                                                
36  There are also some byproducts of the coexistence of r*-g i  with the share price. There is a
benefit from having the cost of capital there if our data on average share price are not
accurate depictors of the value of the business sector as a whole or if share price fluctuations
are neither the effect nor the cause of changes in managers’ valuations of business assets.
Then at least the possibility is open that r* and g will survive to demonstrate that asset
valuations are important.29
Source:  OECD. Variables are in percent except the price of shares and the price of oil. The
share-price index is normalised by labor productivity which is defined as GDP per employed
worker. The world average share price is the simple average of the normalised national
indices for 18 countries (Portugal excluded because of limited coverage).
We then add the ratio of the national share-price index to the OECD average
share price in the sample to test if domestic share prices impinge on domestic
unemployment in a way different from the world average. We find that this is
not so – the ratio is negatively correlated  with  unemployment and more
significant than the OECD average standing on its own. It is also interesting
to note that the total effect of a rise in the OECD average, the national share-
price index unchanged, is positive contrary to any Keynesian hypothesis of a
world-wide wealth effect on domestic demand. To obtain the fourth column
of coefficients we regressed the normalized share price for each country on
the world real interest rate, the trend rate of productivity growth and the real
price of oil. We then took the residual from that regression and put it in place
of the original share price variable – i.e. we only include the component that
is orthogonal to the other regressors. We found that this transformation did
not affect the results qualitatively.
A basic question for this paper is whether the differences in the evolution
of share prices across countries can explain why some economies’
employment rates have improved better than expected while others have done
worse.
37 We now look at the country data to see if we can explain the pattern
shown in Table 5 – to see why some countries have had lower and others
higher unemployment in the recent past than predicted by our baseline
equation. We rank the countries in terms of the rise in average share prices
and the change in average unemployment between the periods 1970s (1970-
79) and 1990s (1990-99) and show the relationship between the two in Figure
5. The rank correlation is –0.60 which implies that the greater the rise in share
prices, the smaller the rise (or larger the fall) in average unemployment.  This
negative relationship is apparent in the figure.
                                                                
37 A related question is if, at the microeconomic level, company employment moves with
share prices in the long run – persistently low share prices imply  persistently low
employment. This we test in Appendix C and find that this is in fact so in our sample.30
Figure 5. The Ranking of Changes in Share Prices and Unemployment
between 1970-1979 and 1990-1999
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
This relationship also shows up when we add the change in the
normalised share price between the average of the 1980s and the average of
the 1990s to the cross-section estimation above. Table 12 is an extension of
Table 8 in that changes in share prices are added to the list of macroeconomic
shocks.



























(3.86) 2 R 0.82
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. The table
shows regressions of the form:
e a a + D + = - Y u u s s 1 0 80 90
where u90s is the average unemployment rate in the 1990s, u80s the average rate in the 1980s



























We now look closer at US data, then the high-unemployment countries of
France, Germany, Italy and Spain and finally two countries that have had
lower unemployment than expected, Ireland and New Zealand.
United States
In the United States, estimates of the natural rate of unemployment have
an upward drift in the 1970s and 1980s,
38 but the 1990s show a downward
movement with a sharp drop beginning at mid-decade. We have found that
the US unemployment rate was in 1998 around 156 basis points below that
what our baseline regression predicted in out-of–sample simulations. The
forces behind these recent developments are a subject of debate. One of us
recently argued that the steep descent of the natural rate in the U.S. since
early 1995 is largely attributable to the stock-market boom
39: The rise in the
price of equity may reflect a rise in the valuation of the marginal employee.
The latter would in turn cause the rate of inflow into employment to go up as
firms expand their hiring and training. To assess this hypothesis we show in
Figure 6 a stock-market index for the U.S. normalized by productivity (solid
line) alongside the rate of employment (broken line).
Figure 6.  Share Prices and the Rate of Employment in the US
 
Source: IMF and OECD.
It appears that the share-price series tracks the low-frequency – or decade-to-
decade – movements in the employment rate fairly well. Note that this occurs
at lower than so-called business-cycle frequencies. In fact, the discrepancy
                                                                

























between the two series points out business cycles, which have brought either
accelerating or decelerating inflation. This indicates a divergence between the
actual unemployment rate and the natural rate: The late 1960s show a rise in
employment not explained by high asset prices (period of rising inflation).
The early 1980s had a cyclical downturn caused by the Volcker disinflation.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, we may in the last few years have had
unemployment above its natural rate, not because of its own rise but because
of a fall in the natural rate itself. This may have allowed the unparalleled
recent expansion to continue without rising inflation.
France, Germany, Italy and Spain
These four countries all had higher unemployment in the 1990s than
expected from our baseline equation (2). Figure 7 shows the  normalized
share-price index and employment rate for France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Figure 7. Share Prices and Employment in France, Germany,
Italy and Spain
Starting with Spain, the relationship is very clear. The fall in employment




















































































persistently low rate of employment after 1980 also corresponds to
persistently low real share prices..
In France, the employment rate started its descent around the same time
although a slight fall can be seen as early as the late 60s.  A fall in share
prices preceded the drop in employment to a lower plateau. However, an
important difference with Spain arises when it comes to recent years.  After
1985, the French stock market has recovered much of its lost ground. Its
value in 1998 was not much different from that found in the early 1970s when
we have  normalized by productivity. But the employment rate has not
recovered significantly. This implies that either the stock market is
overvalued in the 1990s or that there is a persistent slump with the rate of
unemployment exceeding the natural rate.
German employment started its descent slightly later. It fell sharply in the
first halves of the 1970s and the 1980 and then again in the 1990s. This fall
was preceded by falling share prices. As in the case of France, the further fall
in the 1990s is not explained by a further fall in share prices. Share prices
recovered some of their lost ground in the latter part of the 1980s, as did
employment, but then held their ground through the 1990s when employment
declined somewhat.
Italy shares the time pattern of France and Germany to a large extent.
Both real share prices (again  normalized by productivity) and the rate of
employment had a downward trend since the mid1960s up to 1980. We can
look at the continued rise in unemployment after 1980 as initially a delayed
response to the earlier fall in asset valuations reflected in stock-market prices
and then, in the 1990s, a result of the restrictive monetary policy which
preceded the establishment of the single currency.
Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand
Finally, we show in Figure 8 three of the recent good performers that are
included in the OECD’s success stories: Ireland, the Netherlands and New
Zealand. These countries have had rising employment in the past five years or
so. We can see that share prices rose prior to the recent rise in unemployment.
While this is in no way conclusive evidence for our thesis, it is a much-
overlooked fact that is supportive of our hypothesis about the role of asset
prices in employment determination.34
Figure 8. Share Prices and Employment in Ireland, the Netherlands
and New Zealand
Granger Causality
The long-run relationship between share prices and the rate of
employment is consistent with our model. Of course, many other models
would find stock price variations positively related to measures of economic
expansions such as changes in employment. A point of departure between our
model and the main alternatives – such as variants of the Keynesian model –
involves the treatment of  labor as a quasi-fixed asset. In our model, firms
decide to hire new workers when they become more optimistic about future
profitability even when they only want to maintain their current level of
output. In models where labor can be hired and fired at little cost, changes in
employment coincide with changes in output. Another difference is that in
Keynesian models with a fixed natural rate or fixed Phillips curve changes in
employment should be positively correlated with inflation and, in principle,





































































We first test explicitly whether changes in share prices precede changes in
the unemployment rate using a Granger causality test and using the raw
unemployment- and share-price series. Results are in column (4) of
Table 13. Granger causality tests of changes in share prices “causing”
changes in unemployment  (2 lags included, data from 1960-1998)
Obs Raw series Corrected
unemployment
     F          Prob.
(1)
    F             Prob
(2)





















Note:  ** indicates rejection at 5% level, * indicates rejection at 10% level.
The test results using the raw series indicate that changes in share prices
Granger-cause change in the unemployment rate in all the countries, although
the level of significance is low for France.
The results so far are consistent with both models that treat  labor as a
fixed asset and also those that do not. So the next step is to first regress
changes in unemployment on changes in output – to take out the
contemporaneous effect of output expansion on employment – and then to
take the residual change in unemployment – the corrected unemployment
series in the table above – and test whether this is preceded by changes in real
share prices. The results for this corrected unemployment series are reported
in column (2) in the table. These are consistent with the earlier results. Thus
the relationship between changes in share prices and changes in
unemployment remains qualitatively unchanged by this correction for the
business cycle.
On the basis of this evidence we conclude that firms increase their hiring
of  new workers when real share prices rise – reflecting enhanced optimism36
about future profitability – independent of current output changes. In other
words, we conclude that the hiring of new workers involves an investment
dimension.
Since investment in physical capital  may  also be a function of shadow
prices (that is,  Tobin’s Q), it is instructive to take a brief glance at the
relationship between unemployment and physical investment at lower than
business-cycle frequencies. We should note that Tobin-Q theory has fallen
into some disrepute due to its apparent empirical failures. However, with our
own forward-looking model of investment in new workers, it is tempting to
compare the predictions of the two models. Appendix A5 has the rate of
investment (I/K) and the employment rate, respectively, for the G7 countries
(ex Japan). While the high-frequency correlations comes as no surprise, the
decade-to-decade correlation in France, Italy and Germany – low
employment periods tend also to be periods of low investment rates – is not to
be expected from conventional theory. Moreover, the turning points in the
advance of unemployment often correspond to the turning points in the rate of
investment. Note that while the rise of unemployment to a higher plateau in
the three unemployment-prone countries corresponds to a fall in the rate of
investment to a lower plateau, both unemployment and the investment rate
show no such behavior in the United States and the United Kingdom. These
low-frequency correlations can be taken as providing some empirical support
for Tobin-Q theory.
Conclusions
Our perspective on the natural rate in any market economy is that, to begin
with, it shifts. It shifts with the economy’s geography and demographics, of
course, and also with the economy’s institutions: tax and regulatory law,
corporate ownership and governance, and welfare state protections and
provisions. Furthermore, it doesn’t just shift: It fluctuates as a result of
business shocks disturbing firms’ asset valuations, productivity and wealth.
An advantageous feature of our models is that entrepreneurs’ expectations
about the future, say, future productivity, hence future profits, or future
interest rates, enter the story through their impact on the valuations of the
types of business assets firms invest in, which in turn disturb product and
labor markets. In our past empirical work we estimated that several market
variables had unequal unemployment effects among the countries and we
sought to trace these disparities to institutional differences.37
The unusual record provided by the 1990s permits us to go a great deal
farther in testing this framework. The impetus for the tests made here is a
three-part hypothesis: First, managers’ asset valuations impact sufficiently
strongly on the structural-equilibrium unemployment path that the two wide
swings in economic activity observed in recent decades – the gathering slump
that begin in the mid-1970s and the powerful recovery seen in several
economies in the 1990s – may very well be the effect of swings in those
managerial valuations. Second, the decline and rise in market capitalizations
of firms may be a serviceable mirror, even if only in a distorted or
exaggerated way, of the asset valuations by firms’ managers.
40  Third, the
1990s rise in managerial valuations and the accompanying rise in the stock
market went far beyond what can be explained by the capital-market and
other macroeconomic influences contained in our empirical work, such as
world real interest rates and domestic productivity growth rates, so that in this
instance (and possibly others) the rise in the stock market may have
considerable information value when added to the set of macro-economic
explanans in the study of employment. It may be a sign of managers’
expectations of a one-time future lift in the path of productivity and hence of
profits that is distinct from and additive to any perceived improvement in the
trend growth rate of productivity.
This paper begins our testing of this hypothesis. We first showed that an
out-of-sample simulation of the 1990s with a stripped-down version of our
previous unemployment equations gives some explanation of the recoveries,
where they occur, since many of them coincide with a quickening of domestic
productivity growth and there has been some decline of our world real
interest rate series; yet this simulation cannot fully explain the degree of
recovery observed in the more successful economies of the past decade. We
then showed that the  labor market reforms advocated by the OECD
Secretariat, while helpful in some cases, leave us far short of explaining
which countries recovered in the 1990s and by how much. Yet, snatching
victory from the jaws of defeat, we went on to show that the supplementary
use of a stock-market indicator in our unemployment equations aids
enormously in accounting for the 1990s recoveries.
This finding, we think, testifies to the importance of asset valuations in
the  structuralist theory of employment – no matter whether stock-market
prices are the prime mover driving firms to act, as hinted by Keynes and
                                                                
40  The first part is a substantive thesis in Structural Slumps and the second part is the hypothesis
explored in Phelps (1999).38
argued by Tobin, or whether, as we are inclined to suppose, these prices are
more the  effect of managers’ valuations of business assets, based on their
expectations of future profits and capital costs, than an influence on managers
valuations.  If our results are correct, the widespread impression that stock
markets had no explanatory value was mistaken. The forward-looking Fisher-
Tobin treatment of investing, whether in fixed capital or in employees and
customers, pays off when embedded in an essentially non-monetary theory of
employment and asset acquisition. Also striking, the emphasis on business
confidence by such early students of business fluctuations as Spiethoff – the
idea that beliefs about the future drive the system through systems that need
not me monetary – which had been lost for a century may now be on its way
back.39
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60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
The world real rate of interest
%40
Table 1.   Rate of growth of labor productivity
Country Period
61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-98
Australia 2.4 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.8
Austria 4.6 5.0 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.0
Belgium 4.0 4.1 3.6 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7
Canada 2.1 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
Denmark 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.8
Finland 4.3 4.3 3.3 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6
France - 4.4 3.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.7
Germany 4.1 4.0 3.2 2.1 1.3 - - -
Ireland 3.7 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.6
Italy 6.4 5.2 3.5 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8
Japan 8.3 7.3 5.0 3.0 2.5 2.4 1.5 0.6
Netherl. - 4.4 3.5 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1
Norway 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.7 4.6 3.6 3.9 5.0
NewZeal. 6.4 5.2 4.4 3.4 3.3 2.7 3.8 4.9
Portugal 6.4 6.9 6.8 5.6 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7
Spain 7.9 5.5 4.2 3.1 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.1
Sweden 5.2 4.5 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.0 1.2 0.9
UK 2.7 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5
US 3.1 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.141
Table 2.  Changes in the trend rate of growth of labor productivity
Country Period
61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-98
Australia = = = ﬂ = = › ›
Austria = › › ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = = =
Belgium = = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = = =
Canada = = = ﬂ ﬂ = = = =
Denmark = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = › › › =
Finland = = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = › › = =
France - = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = = =
Germany = = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ - - -
Ireland = › › = ﬂ ﬂ = = › › ›
Italy = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = = =
Japan = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
Netherl. - = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = =
Norway = = › › = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ › › ›
NewZeal. = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = ﬂ ﬂ › › › ›
Portugal = = = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = = =
Spain = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
Sweden = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
UK = = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ = ﬂ ﬂ = =
US = ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ › = = =
=: change less than 20 basis points, › (ﬂ): increase (decrease) in excess of 20
basis points, › ›(ﬂ ﬂ): increase (decrease) in excess of 50 basis points.42
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Unemployment and social spending (share of GDP)






























































































































Estimation results for equation (1) using data from 1960-1998






























































































































































































































































































































































































































Deriving the role of productivity and tax rates
The logic of the derivation of the compound variable involving  labor
productivity and labor tax rates is this. The model can be viewed as determining
labor cost per employee, called “the wage to employers,” as a  ratio to
productivity. Yet its quitting behavior is a function of the wage after payroll taxes
and income tax, called “the wage to employees,” expressed as a ratio to nonwage
income. To disentangle this knot one needs first to divide both numerator and
denominator in the latter ratio by the ratio of employee wage to employer wage,
which makes the new denominator equal to the employer wage. One next divides
both the new numerator and the new denominator by productivity, so that the
employer wage in the denominator appears in ratio to productivity, as desired.
The final numerator is then nonwage income as a ratio to productivity times the
ratio of the employee wage to the employer wage. That is equal to  nonwage
income multiplied by the ratio of employer wage to employee wage and divided
by productivity.47
APPENDIX B2
A Dynamic System Underpinning Our Hypothesis
A simple dynamic system to back the story in Figure 4 is the open economy
in Hoon-Phelps (1992) and Phelps (1994). The closed economy would also serve.
Here, firms’ assets are their employees, which are costly to train. There are rising
marginal training costs. The real interest rate in terms of the economy’s product
is equal to the world real interest rate, r*, which is taken to be fixed.
We add fixed capital in a simple way by admitting imports of equipment on
short-term lease from overseas suppliers with zero transport costs. When
employees move from producing to training they need the same equipment. The
amount of capital per augmented employee, K/Lt N, is determined by the demand
function, k, which is decreasing in the given unit rental,  r* +  d. Output per
augmented employee allocated to production is given by  f(k (r* + d)) and the
rental per augmented employee is (r* + d ) k(r* + d). Output and rental per
unaugmented production worker are Ltj(r* +d) and Lt R(r* +d), respectively.
In this setting, each identical firm, to maximize shareholder value, chooses
the current hire rate, h, and wage, v, that maximize a Hamiltonian function. That
function involves the current proportion of employees engaged in training per
hiree, given by b(h), which is an increasing function of h; the mortality rate, q;
the quit rate, z, which is a function of the unemployment rate, u, and of nonwage
income, y
W, as a ratio to the wage; the shadow price the firm optimally awards
itself for every current employee; and its current stock of employees, N. The
current-value Hamiltonian is
       {Ltj(r* +d) -b(h) Ltj(r* +d) – Lt R(r* + d) – v
+q [h - z(1-u, y
W/v) - q ]} N.
The necessary conditions for a maximum give the relationships behind the
figures in the text. In these equations it will also be convenient to write the
equations in terms of the normalized wage, v/Lj, the normalized shadow price,
q/Lj, and normalized nonwage income, y
W/Lj. This introduces the actual and
expected growth rate of L, to be denoted l.48
For a maximum, q must satisfy the arbitrage equation
d(q/Lj)/dt = - [1 + h b’(h) - b(h) – R/j - v/Lj]
 + [z (1-u, (y
W/Lj)/(v/Lj) + q + r*-l)] q/Lj. (1)
It says that a capital gain (loss) is needed to make up any shortfall (surplus) of the
marginal profitability of employees, Lj [1 + h b’(h) - b(h) – R/j - v/Lj], over
the economic interest and depreciation entailed, which is q [[z + q + r*-l)].
The optimal wage balances the marginal benefit of a small increase of the
wage rate that results from the consequent reduction in the quit rate against the
marginal cost in terms of the payroll on existing employees of the same small rise
of the wage rate. This gives the condition





Here both  lefthand and  righthand sides have been multiplied by  v/Lj for
typographical simplicity. The original righthand side gives the two effects on the
quit rate of an increase in pay, both effects multiplied by the normalized worth of
the quits averted. The original righthand side is equal to one.
The optimum scale of current hiring is at the point where the cost of
speeding up by the amount of one new hire (as a ratio to the employee stock)
would be just worth the gain per unit time from adding employees at that faster
rate. The condition is b’(h) = q/Lj, which is convenient to write in the form
h = f (q/Lj), (3)
where f’(q/Lj) > 0. Using that, we have the equation of motion for employment,
dN/dt  = [f (q/Lj) - z (1-u, (y
W/Lj)/(v/Lj) - q ](1 - u), (4)
where without loss of generality units are chosen such that N ” 1 - u.
The stationary loci. To obtain the Asset Price Curve, which is the stationary
locus for normalized q in Figure 4 we need only set the left-hand side of equation49
(1) equal to zero, use (3) to substitute for h, and use (2), which implicitly gives
v/Lj as a function, say, V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj). This gives the stationary locus
0= -[1+f(q/Lj)b’(f (q/Lj)) -b(f (q/Lj)) –R/j -V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj)]
 + [z (1-u, (y
W/Lj)/V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj) + q + r*-l] q/Lj.  (5)
Given y
W/Lj, the normalized share price can be shown to be decreasing in 1-u.
With a standard Blanchard-Yaari formulation of the accumulation of  nonwage
income, Hoon and Phelps show that the long run relationship is also negatively
sloped.
To obtain the Employment Curve we proceed similarly, setting the left-
hand side equal to zero and again using (2) to substitute V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj) for
v/Lj. This gives the stationary locus
0 = [f (q/Lj) -z(1-u, (y
W/Lj)/V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj)) -q](1 -u). (6)
Given  y
W/Lj, the employment variable can be shown to be increasing in the
normalized shadow price. Again, with a Blanchard-Yaari formulation, the long
run relationship is also positively sloped.
Dynamics. A common short cut in analyzing dynamic systems takes the more
slow-moving of the two state variables, here the non-wage income variable, to be
temporarily constant and analyzes the dynamics of the faster-moving of these
variables, employment, accordingly. Here, this subsystem is simply equations (1)
and (4) after making the substitutions for v and h from (2) and (3):
   d(q/Lj)/dt = -[1+ f(q/Lj)b’(f (q/Lj)) –b(f (q/Lj)) -R/j –V
s(1-u,q/Lj)]
 + [z (1-u, (y
W/Lj)/V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj) + q + r*-l] q/Lj,  (7)
    d(1 -u)/dt = [f (q/Lj) -z(1-u, (y
W/Lj)/V
s(1-u, q/Lj; y
W/Lj)) -q](1 -u).  (8)
Analysis of this medium-run system gives the equilibrium motion along a
negatively sloped “saddle path” leading (from either side) to the intersection of
the Asset Price Curve and the Employment Curve corresponding to the given
y
W/Lj – dubbed here the medium-term rest point.50
One kind of shock to this system is a sudden increase in the expected rate of
labor augmentation, l. Analysis of this system yields the intuitive result that such
a shift of  l generates an upward shift of both the Asset Price Curve and the
saddle path, hence a jump of the normalized share price, followed by a gradual
sinking of that variable to its higher medium-term rest-point value and a gradual
rise of employment toward its likewise higher medium-term rest-point value.
Even if real-life economies fluctuated only up and down this saddle path,
there might be a reason to add a  normalized stock-market indicator to the
employment growth equation. Such an indicator could serve as a proxy for
omitted asset stocks, such as customers and even fixed capital, which is rarely
well measured.
The shock highlighted in Figure 4 brings out the major value added of a
stock-market indicator. This shock is a sudden anticipation of a one-time shift at
a future date in the path of productivity and thus of profits per unit of assets. That
shock requires a difficult analysis with respect to the aftermath of the shock,
since the quantum jump in productivity, once it actually occurs, has a quantum
effect on the wealth-to-productivity ratio, so that ratio can no longer be held
constant for analytical simplicity. But our interest is only in the existence of an
expansion phase following the sudden anticipation of the future productivity
shift. The reasoning to our conclusions that the asset price immediately jumps
and that employment, if initially steady, will then be rising until the moment of
the productivity shift appears inescapable. In such a ‘bubble’ scenario, a
normalized stock-market indicator can serve to pick up the expectation of the
future parameter shift – in our example, the productivity shift.51
APPENDIX C
Share Prices and Company Employment
    In this section we take a look at company data for Canada (Toronto),
France (CAC40), Germany (DAX), Italy (Milan), the U.K. (FT) and the
U.S. (DJ). This has the advantage of looking at changes in employment
over time for units that share the same macroeconomic environment. We
then test for the effect of real share prices p
s and profits (net profit margin,
pr) on employment (N) growth. In addition, we allow employment growth
to be affected by the change in the growth rate of nominal GDP, Y, which
proxies for (macroeconomic) demand shocks. We estimate for each of the





it Y pr p
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N
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D 2
3 2 1log
where  t denotes a company-specific fixed effect. The results for the
period 1987-1998 are reported in Table 4 while the list of companies is in
an appendix.
Table 4.  Results using Company Data





































Notice that the real share price is significant and correctly signed in all
the countries apart from Italy, while the profit margin is only significant
in Canada. The demand shock is correctly signed and significant only in
Germany and Italy but incorrectly signed in Canada and the U.K.52
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